Underdetermination: The Gap Argument
Underdetermination arguments for the value-ladenness of science extend Duhem's & Quine's thoughts about testing.
The many forms of underdetermination argument have in common the idea that some gap exists between theory & observation.
The gap may be the need for auxiliary assumptions in order for theories to generate testable hypotheses, or choice between identically confirmed rival theories, etc.
Feminists, pragmatists, and others have sought to fill that gap with social values, or to argue that doing so does not violate rational prescriptions on scientific inference. Call this the gap argument for value-laden science (Intemann 2005) .
It has been argued that highly controversial permanent or global forms of underdetermination are needed to defeat the value-free ideal of science (Kitcher 2001 In accepting/rejecting hypotheses, scientists can never have complete certainty that they are making the right choice.
So inquirers must decide whether there is enough evidence to accept/reject the hypothesis. (e.g., tradeoff of α & β)
What counts as enough should be determined by how important the question is, i.e., the seriousness of making a mistake.
That importance or seriousness is in part an ethical question, dependent on the ethical evaluation of the consequences of error. Call this the error argument for the value-ladenness of science (Elliott 2011).
Values should not be taken as reasons for accepting / rejecting the hypothesis, on a par with evidence. This is an impermissible direct role for values.
In their permissible indirect role, values help determine the rules of scientific method, e.g., rules about how many false positives or false negatives to accept.
Withholding judgment about hypothesis, and instead asserting only the probability that the hypothesis is true, does not eliminate inductive risk and thus the need for values.
First, because inductive risks occur in prior phases of the inquiry, and second, because probability statements may be open to inductive risks.
A Shared Premise
These two arguments against the value-free ideal of science share a common premise.
The gap argument holds that values can play a role in the space fixed by the evidence; if the gap narrows, there are fewer ways in which values can play a role, and if the gap closes, the conclusion must be value-free.
The error argument allows values to play a role in decisions about how to manage uncertainty-not directly by telling us which option to pick, but indirectly in determining how much uncertainty is acceptable.
Both arguments take evidence as fixed in the context of certification, and values play a role in the space left over-they assume the lexical priority of evidence over values.
This premise guarantees that even in value-laden science, values do not compete with evidence when the two conflict.
Why Priority?
Why such a strict priority of evidence over values? One obvious possibility concerns the objectivity of science.
This isn't quite right, as most of the opponents of the value-free ideal we're concerned with hold that science is still objective, that values & objectivity are not in conflict as such.
The key concern is that value judgments might "drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion"(Anderson), that inquirers might rig the game in favor of their preferred values.
Douglas (2009): "Values are not evidence; wishing does not make it so."
In other words, a core value of science is its ability to surprise us, to force us to revise our thinking. Call the threat of values interfering with this process the problem of wishful thinking.
Lexical priority of evidence provides a prima facie good way of avoiding this problem.
Problems with Priority
Two related issues:
(1) In the certification phase, these arguments that assume the lexical priority of evidence take a relatively uncritical stance towards the evidence.
Lexical priority treats testing as, given the evidence, what should we make of our hypothesis? Values play a role at the margins of that process.
We already have reason to adopt a more egalitarian attitude about the process (cf. critics of strict falsificationism and empiricism).
(2) The lexical priority assumption also reduces the idea of value judgment to merely expression of preferences rather than proper judgment-it denies that evidence, reliability, or objectivity play a role in value formation.
Such accounts fail to make the important distinction between valuing-mere preference-and value judgment-a reflective decision based on reasons.
Further, it may be possible to provide empirical evidence for value judgments, giving further reason to treat them on par with hypotheses, background assumptions, and bodies of evidence (Anderson 2004).
Avoiding Wishful Thinking without Priority
If we reject the lexical priority assumption and adopt a more egalitarian model of testing, how can we avoid the problem of wishful thinking?
( According to such an account, not only must evidence, theory, and values fit together fit together in their functional roles, they must do so in a way that actually resolves the problem that spurred the inquiry.
Conclusion
Lexical priority is undesirable, and unnecessary for solving the problem it was intended to solve.
The key to the problem of wishful thinking is that we not predetermine the conclusion of inquiry, that we leave ourself open to surprise.
The real problem is not the insertion of values, but dogmatism about values (Anderson 2004).
Notice that the lexical priority of evidence over values coheres best with a dogmatic picture of value judgments, and so encourages the illegitimate use of values.
Evidence may be rejected because of lack of fit with a favored hypothesis and compelling value-judgments, but only so long as one is still able to effectively solve the problem of inquiry.
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